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A Perspective on Modal Sequent Logic
By
Stephen BLAMEY* and Lloyd HUMBERSTONE**
§0. Prefatory Remarks
This paper was drafted in 1981—2 when the first author was lecturing on
modal logic for the Philosophy Subfaculty at Oxford University and the second
author was visiting Oxford on study leave; it was revised the following year.1^
Both of us had been graduate students of D. S. Scott at Oxford in the 1970's and
were impressed by his emphasis on the desirability of isolating the structural
properties of a (logical) consequence relation — such as are encoded in the
principles (jR), (M), and (T) of [11], [12] —from principles relating to specific
connectives. Extending this idea to the case of the modal operators, we found
that distinctions between several well-known systems of (normal) modal logic
could be reflected at the purely structural level, if an appropriate notion of
sequent was adopted. Actually, we work with one notion of sequent in §§1—4
and consider a somewhat more refined version in §5. On later finding that
sequents of the latter type had already been used by M. Sato, who, in §3.4 of
[10], credits the idea to O. Sonobe, we had some misgivings about publishing the
material at full length. That anticipation notwithstanding, however, it appears to
us still worth proceeding with a somewhat abridged version of the paper, both so
as to highlight the original motivation and also because our treatment and Sato's
differ on many points of detail.2) We should mention that K. Dosen, in [4], also
advocates a variation on the traditional idea of what a sequent should look like
for the case of modal logic. Though the framework he sets up is quite different
from our own, he is in part motivated by similar consideratons (e.g., the
concern with 'unique characterization' — see §4 below). Some aspects of our own
way of proceeding may be seen (again, in retrospect) as steps in the execution of
Belnap's "Display Logic' programme (see [2]), in that the rules (a) of §4 serve
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to 'display' the formula in the scope of an occurrence of 'n' standing extricated
from that scope.3)
§1. Introduction
The term 'sequent logic', as it figures in our title, is intended connote any
development of a system of formal logic which proceeds by the application of
rules which transform sequents into sequents. This includes the natural deduction
approach, with rules recast so as to pass from sequents to sequents (thereby
making the manipulation of assumption dependencies explicit), as well as sequent-
calculus presentations in the style of Gentzen, in which rules governing con-
nectives introduce those connectives on the left or the right of the sequents, as
well as approaches which fall under neither of these headings: our own treatment
falls into this last category. Using the symbol 4>-' to separate what is on the left
of a sequent from what is on the right, sequents of a more or less traditional
form appear as objects P>—A, where Fand A are (possibly empty) finite sets of
formulae of the language under consideration. A heuristic, semantically inspired,
reading of such sequents is: if all formulae in Fare true then at least one formula
in A is true. For the sake of separating out structural elements, as mentioned in
§0, we work (until §5) with three-place sequents instead, writing r>-sA, where
now Z is, like F and A, a finite set of formulae. We may think of F as
representing the ordinary premisses of an argument to the (disjunctive) con-
clusion represented by A, and of 2 as representing the 'modal premisses' of this
argument. A heuristic reading would be: if all formulae in F are true, and all
formulae in 2 are necessary, then at least one formula in A is true. In particular,
the distinctively modal rule of 'Necessitation' can be recorded by the sequent-
schema >-(pncp (which appears as (n I )0 in §4); the attempt to record its effect
by cp>-nq) would of course be a mistake, given the present understanding of
'>-'. (In what follows, we do not consider formula-to-formula rules but only
sequent-to-sequent rules, and to avoid confusion with the usage of this paragraph
we will usually refer to the premisses and conclusions of their applications as
premiss-sequents and conclusion-sequents.)
To make the above ideas more precise, we adapt the Kripke semantics for
modal logic to our framework. Though we will not need to refer to specific
connectives until §4, let us suppose that the formulae of our languages — call it
L — are constructed from a stock of atomic formulae PI, .. ./?„,.. . ('prepositional
variables') by means of two singulary connectives -1 and n and one binary
connective A . We are thinking of -• and A as (boolean) negation and conjunction,
with n for 'it is necessary that' (though there is no intention to rule out
alternative non-alethic readings).
A frame is a pair {W, R) in which W + 0 and R c W X W; a structure is a
triple {W, R, V) in which (W, R) is a frame and V: L x W^ {T,F}. R and V
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are referred to respectively as the accessibility relation and the valuation of the
structure. A model is a structure ( W, R, V) with V satisfying, for all x E W, all
cp,
[A]
[n]
Where { W, jR, V) is any structure (not necessarily a model) and r>-^A is any
sequent, we say F>-^A holds at the point ;cE W just in case:
If for all (per, V(q>, x) = T and for all a<E I, V(o, y}=T
for every y such that xRy, then V(ip? x) = T for some ijjE. A.
A sequent will be said to hold in a structure if it holds at every point in the
structure. A sequent fails at a point/in a structure if it does not hold at that
point/in that structure. Below, we shall be introducing various systems of modal
sequent logic by means of certain closure conditions. These conditions can be
expressed as (sequent-to-sequent) rules, so each such characterization of a class
of systems can be regarded as a proof-theoretic presentation of the smallest
system in the class. However, our official understanding of 'system' will be
simply as a collection of sequents (satisfying whatever closure conditions are
specified.) When every sequent in a system S holds in a structure, we say that
the given structure is a structure for 5, and when the structure is also a model,
that it is a model for S. Apart from an occasional aside, we will not be concerned
with frames and so do not define an analogous notion 'frame for S'; further,
until §4, we will be concerned with arbitrary structures without specific attention
to those which qualify as models. If C is a class of structures, a system S is sound
w.r.t. C if each sequent in S holds in every structure in C, complete w.r.t. C if
each sequent holding in every structure in C belongs to 5, and determined by C
when both sound and complete w.r.t. C. Since the sequent 0^00 holds in no
structure, the 'inconsistent' system in which this sequent (along with all others)
is provable is determined by the empty class of structures.
§2e Some Structural Rules
We begin by stating four fundamental structural rules ,4) the first three of
which — reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity principles — are adapted from
Scott (see §0):
(R) <p^q>
(M) r>-zA (T) r,q>^sA r>-xV,A
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(M) and (J) are also called Thinning' and 'Cut', and some of our rules will be
labelled with appropriate variations on these terms, beginning with the fourth of
the basic structural rules, the only one which is distinctively modal:
(Undercut) I>-a
In the statement of this last rule, we write 'Zx-o' for 'Z>-0 a'; a similar ellipsis
will occur elsewhere (and, as usual, notations such as 'Z, a' stand for IU {a},
etc.).5) Any collection of sequents closed under these rules will be called a K3-
system, the superscripted '3' being intended as a reminder of the three-place
sequents with which we are working here. For later reference, we observe here,
and invite the reader to verify that the rules (JR), (M), (J) and (Undercut) all
preserve the property of holding in an arbitrarily selected structure. 6)
We shall prove a schematic completeness result for the above rules as
Theorem 1 below. Some definitions and lemmas. pave the way. In the context of
discussing a system S (all systems considered being K3-systems) we write T\-SA>
to mean that there are finite subsets F0, ZQ, A$ of (the possibly infinite sets) JT,
Z, A, respectively, for which the sequent F0>-£0A) belongs to S; an oblique
stroke through the V serves to negate such a claim. A triple {F, JE1, A) is S-
consistent iff Fh^A, and maximal S-consistent when S-consistent and such that
any S-consistent (F, Z' , A') with F ^ F, Z'^Z, A' ^ A, is actually identical
with (F, Z, A). Finally, when we use the notation D{F|...F. ..} for the
intersection of a collection of sets of formulae, by convention we understand
f! 0 to be the set L of all formulae. The lemmas which follow pertain to any K3-
system S, with consistency understood as S-consistency, etc.
Lemma A0 For any consistent triple (F, Z, A) there is a maximal consistent
triple (F, r, A1) with F'iDF, I'^Z, A' ID A.
Proof. By a Lindenbaum construction.
Lemma B0 , For any maximal consistent (F, Z, A)
%= n {F'| for some 1", A', (F', 2", A') is maximal consistent and ,TcF'}
Proof. Clearly I is included in the intersection in question. For the con-
verse, suppose o£Z. It follows that F\-^aA. Hence ZV-a. (Otherwsie, by
(Undercut), Fh^-A.) Therefore, by Lemma A, there is a maximal consistent {F',
Z',-A') such that Z^ F' and a£ F' (because o£Ar: closure of S under (R) rules
out a's belonging to both these sets for S-consistent (F', 2", A')).
We shall show that any K3-system S is determined by the class of all its
structures, i.e., by the class of all structures for S (in the sense of §1). Since no
structure is a structure for the inconsistent system, and this system, as noted at
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the end of §1, is determined by the empty class of structures, we have the result
for that case and pass to the case of consistent S. For these 5, following the
Scott-Makinson adaptation of Henkin completeness proofs (see, e.g., [13]), the
method of proof involves constructing a canonical structure whose elements are
certain S-consistent triples. If S were inconsistent, there would be no such
triples, whereas in the definition of a structure { W, R, V), we have required that
W be a non-empty set.
More precisely, then, the canonical structure for a consistent K3-system S is
defined to be the triple (Ws, Rs, Vs) in which:
Ws: Ws is the set of all maximal S-consistent triples.
RS: <F, z, A) RS <r, r, A') iff scr.
Vs : For any formula cp, Vs(cp, (F, Z, A)) = T if
(F,
A propos of Rs, we remark that in the usual two-place sequent setting for
normal modal logics (as in [8], with an analogous point for the even more
common 'formula' based treatments) Rs would be defined to relate (F, A) to
(F', A') when for all cp such that n<^G F, qpEE. F'. Similarly, we have introduced
the canonical accessibility relation to relate one element of the canonical structure
to another whenever whatever is necessary according to the former is true
according to the latter, but since we have introduced a special position (the
'IP-position) to record the status of a formula as necessary, no specifically modal
connectives need to intrude to obtain this effect. And a propos of Vs, notice
that, assuming S to be a K3-system, closure under (R) and (M) guarantees that at
most one of the two conditions in the definition of Vs can be met, while
closure under (T) guarantees that at least one is met. It follows that (Ws, RS,
Vs) is a structure, in our sense; that it is also a structure for S will follow from
Lemma C* A sequent r0>-S()A0 fails at (F, I, A) in (Ws, Rs, Vs) iff
F0 c F, So c= 2, and AQ<^ A.
Proof. "If": immediate, from the definitions of Rs and Vs. 'Only if: Suppose
it is not the case that F0 c F. Then for some <pE F0, g?(£ F, and so Vs(<p-> (F, Z,
A)) = F. Since a necessary condition for F0>-^o A0 to fail at (F, Z, A} is that
V(y, <F, T, A)) = Ffor all ^ eF0, it follows that r^^A^ holds at <F, Z, A).
Similar reasoning applies to the supposition that not A0 c A. So finally, suppose
that not ^0 cX Then for some aEZo, ofeZ. So by Lemma B there is some
<r, 2", A')^WS such that T^F' and a£F'. Hence (F, Z, A)RS(T', Z' ,
A')\ but Vs(o, (F', 2", ^'}) = F. Thus again a necessary condition for the
sequent F0>~2:()^n to fail at (F, 2, zi) is lacking.
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Theorem 1. Any K3 -system S is determined by the class of all its structures.
Proof. That S is sound w.r.t the class of all its structures is trivial, since
any structure in which a sequent in S fails is, by definition, not a structure for 5.
That S is complete w.r.t. the class of all its structures has already been
remarked for the case of inconsistent S. For S consistent, the result will follow if
for any sequent not belonging to 5 we can exhibit a structure for S in which that
sequent does not hold. But the canonical structure (Ws, RS, Vs) will be seen to
suffice in this capacity for all sequents not in 5 at once, provided we check that
(1) it is a structure for S, and (2) only sequents in S hold in this structure.
As to (1): If the sequent F0 >-Xo A0 belongs to 5 then r\rzA for any F^ F0,
A ^ A0, 2^2fa and so no such triple (JT, 21, A) is 5-consistent: thus none are to
be found amongst the elements of Ws. But the 'only if part of Lemma C assures
us that it is only at such triples that F0>-^()zio can fail.
As to (2): If the sequent F0 >-^o A0 does not belong to S then the S-consistent
triple (FQ, Z0, AQ) extends (by Lemma A) to an element of W$, at which, by
the 'if half of Lemma C, the sequent fails.
Remark. As the above proof reveals, a stronger statement than Theorem 1
has been established: Any K3 -system S is determined by its canonical structure.
We turn now to some further structural rules, with a corresponding collection
of completeness results gathered together as Theorem 2. Any K3-system con-
taining all sequents of the form:
(T3) ^aa
will be called a KT3-system. Equivalently, one could define a KT3-system to be
any K3-system closed under the rule:
(Downward shift)
Applying this rule repeatedly, we see that closure under it implies (and is
implied by: take 2" = {a}) the rule
F, Z^zA
whose special case, with F= A = 2=0 we call
Any K3-system closed under this rule we call a KD3-system.
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The classes of K3-system, KT3-sy stems, and KD3-sy stems are so named,
because the smallest such systems closed under the operational rules of §4 below
are our three-place sequent logics corresponding to the well-known normal
modal systems K, KT, and KJ).7) K is the least such system, and the inconsistent
system the strongest. As is also well known, there are two Post-complete normal
modal logics, sometimes called the Trivial System' and the 'Verum' (or 'Absurd')
system, dual atoms in the lattice of all such logics. They are conveniently
broached here; our label in the former case is derived from Chellas [3]. Let a
KT!3-system be any KT3-system closed under the following inverted form of
(Downward Shift):
(Upward Shift) r>-2t(JA
r, o^zA
We can of course study the effects of (Upward Shift) in isolation from (Downward
Shift) (or (T3)), and, again following the notation of [3], let us call any K3-
system closed under (Upward Shift) a KT3-system. A KVer3-system, finally, will
be any K3-system closed under the rule:
(Ver3) r>-zA
r>-A
The analogue of Theorem 1, for these more restricted classes of systems, is the
following.
Theorem 2. // S is (1) any WI3-system, (2) any KD3-system, (3) any KT3-
system, (4) any WVeT3-system, then S is determined by the class of all its structures
( W, R, V) in which, for (1): R is reflexive; for (2): R is serial; for (3): xRy only if
{q>\V(q>, x) = T} c {(p/V(q),y) = T}; and for (4): R is empty.
Proof. For the reasons given in the proof of Theorem 1, it will suffice to
show in each case that the canonical structure for S meets the cited condition. In
fact, we give the proof only for case (1).
Suppose S is a KT3-system and some (F, 21, A) E Ws does not bear the
relation Rs to itself. Thus for some crE Z, a& F. By maximality, then, F, o\-2A,
and so by (Downward Shift) r\-2^aA\ but this is impossible since ex hypothesi
r\/2A.
Part (3) of the Theorem is somewhat surprising, in that one might have expected
the following condition on structures for this case: xRy only if x = y. Then this,
like the other conditions, would have been (in effect) a condition on the frames
of the structures and would accord with familiar experience in modal logic
(where KTC is determined by the class of all frames meeting the condition just
cited). It turns out that if S is a KT3-system closed under the classical rules
governing negation (see §4) then this stronger conclusion can be obtained, since
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in this case for <F, Z, A), <F, 2", A') G W5, if Fez F' then r= r (and so A =
A'), from which it would follow if 5 were also closed under the rules for n in §4
that Z=2f (since I? is then {(p|n(^EF}.8) Indeed even without the n-rules, we
note that for 5 a KT!3-system and {r, 2, A) e Ws we have r= -£ and so T=Tf
implies 2=2?. (The proof of (1) gives that for S a KT3-system, ZcF by
(Downward Shift), and a similar argument invoking (Upward Shift) gives the
converse inclusion.)
We have already noted that the rules (R), (Af), (T) and (Undercut) preserve,
for an arbitrary structure, the property of holding in that structure. Having
since introduced further rules for consideration, we should at this point register
a similar observation in their case for future (§4) reference: namely that the
rules used as closure conditions to characterize the classes of systems figuring in
Theorem 2 preserve the property of holding in any given structure meeting the
corresponding condition. By way of illustration, we check this explicitly for the
KT3-systems, which could be done by showing that the rule (Downward shift)
always leads from a sequent holding in a reflexive structure to a sequent holding
in that structure, or, more simply, by showing that every instance of the schema
(T3) holds in every reflexive structure. This is obvious enough: if >-£7afails in a
structure (W, R, V) then there is x E Wwith V(o,y) = Tfoi all y such that xRy,
but V(o, x) = F; and clearly this cannot happen if x is itself a y such that xRy.
Such results play a part in proving the soundness w.r.t. a class of reflexive
structures of particular KT3-systems in §4. Of course, a given such system will
not be expected to be sound w.r.t. the class of all reflexive structures, since it
will typically contain sequents over the above those guaranteed by the rules (the
K3 rules and (T3)) used to delimit this class of systems — sequents which may fail
in some reflexive structures. (And similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the other
classes of systems and corresponding conditions on structures.)
In this section, we approach from our point of view the familiar modal logics
K4 and S4. The strategy is as in §2: we use purely structural rules to characterize
classes of systems, for which we obtain an 'abstract' completeness result along
the lines of Theorems 1 and 2. But the tactics are somewhat different. As will
become apparent, a slight variation on the method outlined above for the
construction of canonical structures turns out to be called for.
To introduce the topic, we coin a new piece of terminology. Let us say that,
understanding V in relation to some system 5, when ua<^, the formula a yields
the formula cp in 5. Then the condition (T3) on KT3-systerns says that each
formula yields itself in these systems. Accordingly, there is an association, for
such systems not only with the reflexivity of the accessibility relation in the
structures with which we may treat them semantically, but also with the reflexivity
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of the syntactically defined 'yields' relation. While we do not here enter into a
general investigation of such parallels, we note that the above situation also
obtains in respect of transitivity, encountered in the usual model-theoretic treat-
ment of extensions of K4 (cf . Theorem 3 below) and also here in the form of a
condition on the 'yields' relation: the condition that for any a, cp, ip if \-acp and
hvV then ^o^-
Actually, rather than directly translating this condition into 'rule' form, we
prefer a slightly more decked-out formulation:
(Cross-cut)
The rule is so named because we 'cut' the formula a here across categories: it
appears as an ordinary conclusion in the premiss-sequent on the left but as a
special modal premiss in the right-hand premiss-sequent.
In §1, the possibility was mentioned of regarding the schema >—cpn(p as
encoding the rule of Necessitation. To construe the 'yields' relation as thus
expressing the idea of 'yielding by the application of certain (formula-to-formula)
rules', we should naturally expect this relation to be both reflexive and transitive,
as it is for the class of S43-systems (defined below). Indeed, more generally, the
operation Cn defined by Cn(S) = {a\ h^-cr} is, as the notation suggests, a con-
sequence operation (in the sense of Tarski) for such systems. More generally
still, for these systems, the (restriction to pairs of finite sets of the) relation lh
defined by
Z\\-A O h^zi, is a
consequence relation in the sense of Scott. (See [12] for these notions.)
Intriguingly, we have found that although if attention is restricted to systems
closed under the operational rules (offered in §4) for fcnT, then closure under
(Cross-cut) is all one needs to appeal to in order to get completeness results
w.r.t. transitive structures, without such a restriction, a stronger structural rule
than (Cross-cut) appears to be needed. Further, as has already been intimated,
it does not appear to be possible, unless we so restrict our attention, to retain
the same conception of a canonical structure for a system as was deployed in §2.
On the other hand, if we were to assume that S was closed under the operational
rules for 'n', it would again turn out that no modification was required. We
make these alternations — strengthening (Cross-cut) and reconstruing the relations
RS~ because it seems desirable not to have to interrupt the 'purely structural'
approach we have been taking to modal sequent logic.
First, them, the strengthened version of (Cross-cut), achieved by weakening
its left-premiss:
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(4-cut)
Observe that this rule not only strengthens (Cross-cut) by a weakening of its left
premiss (with a thinning on the left), but may at the same time be seen as a
strengthening of (Undercut), again by a weakening of its left premiss (by a
thinning 'below'). Any K3-system closed under (4-cut) — or equivalently, given
the observation just made, any systems closed under (R), (M), (F) and (4-cut) —
we will call a K43-system, and if it is also a KT3-system, we will call it an S43-
system. As a familiarization exercise with the new rule, we suggest that the
reader now verify that if the premiss-sequents of an application of (4-cut) hold in
a structure (W, R, V) with R transitive, then so does the conclusion-sequent.
Looking now in the direction of a completeness theorem in the same vein as
Theorems 1 and 2, we introduce the new notion of canonical structure. For a
consistent system S, the triple { Ws, RS, V$) will be its canonical structure in the
new sense if Ws and Vs are exactly as in §2, while for Rs we put:
<r, z, A) RS <r, z1 A') i
Note that, so defined, Rs is transitive. (This is the case for any K3-system 5. For
K43-sy stems closed under the operational rules for 'n', there is no problem in
showing that the relation Rs as defined in §2 is transitive as well, as we shall
show in §4, but the difficulty alluded to two paragraphs back was over the
impossibility of showing this for arbitrary K43-systems tout court.) Since we have
guaranteed the transitivity of Rs by our new definition, it is clear that the job of
exploiting the (4-cut) rule in the completeness argument will lie elsewhere (unlike
the case of Theorem 2) and indeed we press it into service to show that an
analogue of Lemma B, vital for securing the crucial Lemma C, holds in the
present setting. Let us call this:
Lemma B'. Where S is any K43-system and (T, Z, A) is any maximal
S-consistent triple,
I=H {F\for some A', (F , S', A') is maximal S-consistent and IcF HZ"}
Proof. That Z is included in the intersection is again obvious. For the
converse, suppose a&Z. Then, by maximality, F\-St0A. Now, if it were also the
case that Z\-zo, (4-cut) would give the conclusion that F\-ZA, which we know
not to be so; therefore Z\fso. Thus (Z, Z, {a}) is S-consistent and so extends
to a maximal S-consistent triple (F, I', A') with Zc, F Pi I' and o<£ F (since
aEA'), as required.
Here we have helped ourselves to Lemma A, which holds unaltered, as does
Lemma C (with appeal to Lemma B' replacing the appeal to Lemma B in the
proof of Lemma C in §2). Without further ado, beyond observing that the
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reflexivity of the new Rs is secured, as in Theorem 2, for S43-systems by
(Downward shift), we close with the analogous result for the present section.
Theorem 3. Any K43 -system (S43 -system) is determined by the class of all its
transitive structures (transitive reflexive structures).
Proof. As for Theorem 2, mutatis mutandis.
§4. Some Operational Rules
In this section, we give operational rules for the connectives, including 'n'.
The rules for 'n' do not vary from system to system, any more than the rules
for, say, 'A' do. Rather, they interact with the various structural rules of the
previous sections to give rise to sequent formulations of the different modal
logics.
To begin with the case of 'A ' , there are many sets of rules closure under
which secures completeness w.r.t. the usual truth-functional interpretation of
this connective; for example, this is so for the following rules, here stated, as
befits the three-place sequent formalism, with '2" as an idle parameter:
F, cp A ty^zA
r, <p, y^zA
The double line indicates that we are schematizing a rule for passing from the
top sequent to the bottom sequent, and also a rule for passing from the bottom
sequent to the top sequent.
As is well known, assuming (/?), (M) and (T), a further simplification is
possible, replacing the above one-premiss rules by three zero-premiss (or
'unconditional') rules, namely:
cp A ip>~q) (p A T/; >- 1/; 9, i/;>-<p A ijj
(We do not need to insert the '2" variable here, since we can "thin' it in.9) The
interest, for our purposes, in the replacement here described is the guarantee it
provides, for any system to which all their instantiations belong, that any structure
for the system will, as far as 'A' is concerned, be a model for the system: that is,
the valuation of the structure will assign the value T to a conjunction iff it
assigns the value T to each conjunct. A similar point holds for ' -i ', in view of
the schemata: </9, -1 cp>- and >-cp, ~« (p. (These zero-premiss rules replace the
rules governing -• in, for example, [11], p. 798.) Thus if the only connectives we
had to deal with were 'A' and ' -1 ', we could say that any system closed under
the appropriate rules had the desirable property that all its structures were
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amongst its models. A complete set of rules for 'n', however, as we shall see
below, do not secure this property. Before turning to those rules, we make the
observation that any K3-system closed under the rules for ' A ' will also be closed
under the following two-way rule:
(A demonstration of this fact appeals to (Undercut).) This can be thought of as
a way of saying that necessity distributes over conjunction, without actually
mentioning necessity.
This brings us to necessity itself, for which we have selected the following
pair of rules:
(n) r, no^zA
The downward rule we shall call '(n J, )', with '(n f )' for the upward direction.
It is clear that both rules preserve the property of holding at a point in an
arbitrary model — and a fortiori preserves the property of holding in a model —
no less than do the more familiar rules for 'A' and 4 ~> ' already cited. Further,
the rule (n j ) can be replaced by a zero-premiss rule, the schema:
(a Do ^-o^o
in the sense that closure under (n I ) implies and is implied by closure under
(n | )0 for any K3-system, in virtue of (R), in the one case, and (T) (together
with (M)) in the other. It is not, however, possible to replace ( o f ) with such a
schema. In the light of what was said above about 'A' and ' -1 \ it is evident that
if this were possible, then it would follow that every structure for any K3-systera
closed under the rules (n) was a model for that system. We shall see, with a
simple example presented at the end of this section, that this not the case. In
§5, we explore a shift from three-place to four-place sequents which offers a
remedy in this regard (Theorem 7).
We need some notation for systems closed under the operational rales for
A, -i , and n. A K3-system so closed, we will call a K^-system, a KT3-system so
closed, a KT3-system, and so on. (Obviously, a more sensitive nomenclature
would discriminate in the subscripting between the requirement of closure under
the rules for '-• ' , under those for 'A ' , and under those for 'G'.) If we have
introduced a class of ^-systems, for some label 6Jf , then we denote the smallest
such system by '[X\\ Our three-place versions of the familiar modal logics KT
and §4 are thus denoted [KT3] and [S43], for example. However, the relation-
ship between the modal principles used to define those familiar systems, and our
own 'structural' approach may not be immediately obvious, so we elaborate on
this a little here.
A PERSPECTIVE ON MODAL SEQUENT LOGIC 775
For definiteness, we take the antecedently familiar approach to be that of
two-place sequents r>— A (see [8], for example); the normal modal logics in this
framework, which analogy with our own usage might be called K2-systems, are
those closed under the (non-structural!) rule:
(Normality) <Pi , . . . ,«Pn^
 n => 0
To derive this rule in our framework, apply (Undercut) to its premiss-sequent
and the (n I )0 sequent >^^ n i/;, giving
from which the conclusion-sequent follows by n applications of (n f ). A sequent
form of the familiar T principle is shown to belong to any KT3 -system thus:
a>-o (R)
>—(jO (Downward shift)
na>-or ( n f )
Of course the second line here is the schema (T3); we give the three-line proof
for the sake of comparison with the following, which shows that the converse
sequent belongs to any KT3n-system:
na>-na (R)
>-0na ( n j , )
cr>-n<7 (Upward shift)
As our final illustration, we consider the 4 schema n<^>— nncp. To show that an
arbitrary sequent of this form belongs to any K43 -system, we note that by the
transitivity of the 'yields' relation (in §3) for any such system, from the two
(n I )0 sequents >-cpnq) and >-acpnnq), we obtain >-<rnn(^, whence the
desired result follows by (n f ). In terms of our officially baptized rules, this
appeal to the transitivity of 'yields' is a special case of the rule (Cross-cut) from
§3. We do not need to appeal to the definitive (4-cut) rule which was described
as stronger in the context of BC3-systems and which we are about to see is not
stronger in the context of K3 -systems. To show that closure, for such systems,
under (Cross-cut) implies closure under (4-cut), we use the fact, just demonstrated,
that the sequents n^>-nn^ are derivable from (Cross-cut); from these in
turn, we shall derive (4-cut). In virtue of (M), it suffices to derive (4-cut) in the
special Z=Sr case — that is, to show that any (Cross-cut)-closed system con-
taining I>~^aand r>—^^0A also contains F^-SA\ taking 2= {o^. . . ,a/;} and
writing nl^ for {noi,. . . ,na/;}:
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Z>~z0 (Given by hypothesis)
21, nZ>—0 ((n | ) n times) F>-^0A (Given by hypothesis)
r>-ZtnsA (Undercut)
r, nnZ>-sA (n applications of (n f )
whence, since we have each sequent na/>-nna/ ( l < f < n ) , by n applications
of (T):
F,
and then a further n applications of (n I ):
r>~s,zA, i.e.,
So much for extracting more familiar looking modal principles out of our
structural rules and the rules (n). Before passing to the topic of completeness,
we indicate why the rules (n) commend themselves as appropriate. Their appro-
priateness on semantic grounds will already be evident. They do nothing more
then directly reflect the intended interpretation of 'n', (n | ) reflecting the
sufficiency of the condition that q) be true at all accessible points for the truth of
ncp at a given point, and (n f ) reflecting the sufficiency of that condition.
However, there is also a purely proof-theoretic side to the picture: these rales
uniquely characterize 4n' in the sense that for any singulary connectives 'DJ' and
'n2' both governed by these rules, we have D1^hn2^ and conversely.10^ For,
by (R), a system in the language of both these operators contains u\q)>- n^,
whence by (n j ) for n^ >-vn1(^, and then, applying (n f ) for n2, we get
n2<p>-tJi<p. The derivation of the converse sequent of course uses (n j ) for n2
and (n f ) for n^ While the truth-functional connectives are thus uniquely
characterized by the rules governing them in traditional (two-place) sequent-
logical approaches (sequent-calculi, natural deduction, etc.), it can be shown
that no such approach can uniquely characterize 4n' for any but the Post-
complete normal modal logics (in which, in effect, this connective itself receives
a truth-functional interpretation). This strongly suggests that the move from
truth-functional to modal logic is not one best made simply by adding a new
primitive connective with new rules governing it, but rather by extending one's
conception of the objects to be manipulated by such rules. Hence the novel form
of the sequents we have been working with.
We turn now to the topic of completeness. It is not difficult to convert
Theorems 1—3 into results pertaining to models instead of structures in general,
when closure under the operational rules presented in this section is assumed for
the systems concerned — to show, that is, that any K^-system is determined by
the class of all its models, any KD|-system by the class of all its reflexive
transitive models, and so on. Given those earlier theorems, it suffices to show
that the canonical structures for the systems are indeed models. The latter
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involves showing that their valuations treat A , -1 , and n compounds as required
by [A], [-•] and [n] in §1. The only case calling for some thought here is the
last, which we settle in Lemma D, after noting that the common form of
Lemmas B and B' from §2 and §3, respectively, may be stated thus:
(*) For all (r, 2, A)<=WS,
i= n {r | <r, 2, A) RS <F, 2', A') for some 2', A'}
Lemma D. For any K^-system S, whether ( Ws, RS, V$) is defined as in §2
or as in §3, for <JT, 2, A)£WS, Vs(nq>, <F, S, A)) = Tiff for all <F, 2',
A1) ^ws such that <r, 2, 4) /?5 <r, r, 4'), v5(<p, <F, r, 4'» = r.
/. '0H/y r/': Suppose Vs(n<p, <r, 2, 4)) = T. Then n ^ E T b y the
definition of Fs, so <pE2, by (n t ). Therefore <pGF for all (F, 2', 4') such
that (T, 2, 4) fls (F, 2", A'), by the c-direction of (*), whence Vs(cp, <F,
2', A'}) = T for each such (F, 2', 4'), by the definition of V5.
7/': Suppose T/s(<p, (r, 2", A')) = Tfor each <r , 2", Zi ;) such that <r, 2, 4>
J?s {F, 2", A'). Then (by Del F5) <peT' for each such <r, 1", Zi ') , and so
(by the ^-direction of (*)), <p£2. Therefore by (n|), nqpG2, whence (by
Def. Vs) Vs(nq), (F, 2,
In fact, as was mentioned in §3, it is not necessary to alter the definition of
RS in §2 in order to deal with K4n-systems, thanks to their closure under the
operational rules, as indicated by the 'n' subscript. The relation Rs as defined in
§2 is already transitive for such 5, and indeed coincides with the definiens for Rs
offered in §3. For it is not hard to show that given any (T, 2, A), (Ff , 2',
A')E: W$, for S a K4n-system, if 2c F then 2c 2'. (Supposing that 2c F and
aG2, with a view to showing that a€E2', begin by noting that naEF, and
hence — exploiting the '4' property — that nnaEF; we leave the reader to
complete the argument.)
We have not bothered to label the converted (structures-to-models) versions
of Theorems 1,2, and 3 as a spearate Theorem. We turn to completeness results
which fall out from the discussion for the specific systems [Kn], [KTn], etc.
Theorem 4, The systems [Kj], [KD£], [KT?D] [KT&], [KVerJ], [K4S],
flwd [S4o] are determined by the classes of models ( W, R, V) where, respectively,
R is arbitrary, R is serial, R is reflexive, R is included in the identity relation, R is
the identity relation, R is the empty relation, R is transitive, and R is both
transitive and reflexive.
Proof. Soundness: Since the system [X] is the least system satisfying the
closure conditions on being an X-system (taking X= KQ, KTn, etc.), an inductive
proof is possible, showing that the rules formulating those conditions preserve
the property of holding in a model of the class in question. We have already
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been through the details for the case of [Kn] in showing (in §2) that (1?), (M),
(T), and (Undercut) preserve the property of holding in any structure, and a
fortiori in any model, and noting (in the present section) that all our operational
rules preserve the property of holding in any model. We have also noted in §2
and §3 that the rules defining KT^-systems and K4n-systems enjoy this feature
w.r.t. those models which are, respectively, reflexive and transitive. The re-
maining cases are similar.
Completeness: This is established by the remarks leading up to the proof of
Lemma D, which show that the canonical structures for these systems are in fact
models for the systems. For the cases of [KT^J and [KT!n], we exploit closure
under the rules for -1 , recalling the comments following Theorem 2.
The completeness results collected in Theorem 4 were derived from the
observation that the canonical structures for the systems concerned were models
for those systems. This by no means implies that every structure for any such
system is a model, and in fact this is false. The following is a structure for [Kn]
(indeed, for [KVerS]) which falls short of being a model. For some object H>, let
W={w}, RI = {{w,w}}, and V be the unique valuation on W such that:
) = F for all prepositional variables pL
ip, w) = T iff F(<p, w) = V(\l>,w) = T
V( - <p, w) = T iff V(<p, w) = F
V(nq), w) = T for all formulae q).
Clearly the structure (W, R±, V) is not a model, since, for example, V(npi,
w) = T while for some y e W (namely, w itself) we have wR^y and V(p\, y) = F.
It remains to show that { W, R±, V) is a structure for [Kn]. To that end, consider
the different structure ( W, RQ, V) where J?0 is the empty relation on W. Note
that this structure is a model: so every sequent in [Kn] holds in it. The result we
seek — that every such sequent holds in the original struture — will follow if we
can show that any sequent holding in (W, /?(), V) holds in (W, /?i, V): but this
is immediate.
To the extent, then, that one sees it as a desideratum that one's logical
framework should provide notions of structure and model according to which
every structure for a system closed under a complete set of operational rules
must be a model for that system, one will be dissatisfied with the framework we
have so far provided, the various completeness theorems notwithstanding. As
we shall see, the three-place sequent framework may be viewed as something of
a half-way house in this regard, between the more conventional two-place frame-
work and something richer still.
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§5. Four-Place Sequents
The development thus far has perhaps conveyed the respects in which our
treatment of modal logic using three-place sequents improves on more traditional
approaches, by distinguishing special modal (Imposition) premisses from 'ordinary'
(r-position) premisses. A certain refinement of that treatment will now be
suggested, invoking a similar distinction amongst conclusions, which retains its
benefits (unique characterization of 'n', smooth mesh between semantics and
proof-theory, etc.) while eliminating such anomalies as remain: for example, the
existence of structures for logics which are closed under the operational rules,
which structures fail to be models. Further, as will hardly have escaped the
reader's notice, our sampling of the range of normal modal logics has been very
selective, and conspicuously absent from that selection was any account of the B
('Brouwersche') principle, cp>— n "• n ~> (p, (or, for short: cp>~n()q)). Likewise
for the 5 schema: ()q)>—n()(p Thus no route was provided to that best-loved of
all modal logics, S5. While there would be no difficulty in adding such principles
as they stand, we are naturally more interested in achieving their effect by the
use of structural rules, and the four-place sequents with which we shall now be
working provide a framework in which the desired rules can be formulated.
From this point on, a sequent will be an object r>-f*4, and our systems
will be certain collections of these; their labels will bear a superscripted '4' to
replace the C3' of the sequent systems in the three-place framework hitherto
dominant. In connexion with such a system, the metalinguistic notation Fhjf 4
is to be understood analogously to its three-place namesake. Semantic concepts
defined in terms of the notion of a structure are to be understood exactly as in
§1, though of course, we need a new definition of what it is for a sequent to hold
at a point in such a structure, and in fact say that F>—§ A holds at x in the
structure (W. R, V) iff:
// for all <p E T, V((p, x) = T and for all aE I V(o, y) = T for each y (E W
such that xRy, then either there exists i/;E A such that V(ip, x) = T or for some
0G e, V(0, y) = T for each y E W such that xRy,
In more colloquial terms, the sequent holds just in case if all of Fare true and all
of 2 are necessary, then either some of 4 are true or else some of 0 are
necessary.
A collection of (four-place) sequents is a K4-system iff it is closed under the
following rules:
(R) (p^-cp (Vertical^) >-°a
(M) r>-JA (Undercut) I^o r^-f.g4
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(T) r,q»-iA r>-jcp,A (Vertical T) r>-%aA r>-f° A
r>-jA
As to alternative definitions of this same class of systems, we confine ourselves
to the observation that closure under the above rules (in particular, (Undercut)
and (Vertical R)) implies closure under this rule:
(Switch) Z>-o
and that, conversely, (Switch) delivers (Vertical R) from (J?) and (Undercut)
from (Vertical T). We remark that (Switch) can be thought of as a 'n'-free
version of the rule (Normality) in the preceding section.
The following result is proved by a straightforward modification of the
canonical structure methods of §1, except that now such structures should
consist of quadruples (F,Z,0,A) where the sets involved are maximally such
that F\f®A\ the same definition of Rs as in §2 will do. For the analogue of
Lemma A in §2, the new rules (Vertical R) and (Vertical T) need to be exploited
(as well as (M): these have the effect that the 2 and 0 of such maximal
quadruples are complements).
Theorem 5. Any K4-system is determined by the class of all its structures.
This is the analogue of Theorem 1 in §2. Rather than repeating the analogues of
Theorems 2 and 3, we pass straight to a case not treated before, and define a
KB4-system to be one closed under the rule:
(B-cut) Z >-A a r >-f? 0 A
r>-JA
To get a feel for this rule, we recommend that the reader verify that whenever
its premiss-sequents hold in a structure (W, R, V) in which R is symmetric, so
does the conclusion-sequent. This, together with the following Theorem, gives
the result that [KBa] is determined by the class of all symmetric models, though
the subscripting notation here has to be explained anew for the 4-place frame-
work (see below).
Theorem 69 Any KB4-system is determined by the class of all its symmetric
structures.
Proof. It will be enough to remark that we may define a symmetric relation
Rs which for the systems in question gives the appropriate analogues of Lemmas
B and C, by
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R s r'Z'&,A' i X ^ r and
As for the [ ]-notation in the present framework, we take over the unconditional
rules for A and -• from §4, and understand by rules for n, those stated as (n) in
that section but with an additional variable for sets of formulae sitting in the
upper 'O'-position (remaining unchanged from premiss-sequent to conclusion-
sequent). If we take over the label (4-Cut) from our discussion in §3 with a
similar understanding (fixed ©-variable) and define a K44-system to be a K4-
system closed under (Undercut) so understood, then for our version of S5,
namely, [KTB44], we have the result that this system is determined by the class
of all models whose accessibility relation is an equivalence relation, as one
would expect. (We omit details). However, the greatest theoretical significance
of the use of the rules (n) in the four-place framework is not so much in the
structural tractabiiity of these new modal logics, as in the fact that now not only
can (n J, ) be given an equivalent unconditional formulation (as (n 4 )0), but so
can (n | ). We call this (n f )0: ncp^v. To obtain (n f )o from (n f ), apply
the latter rule to the (Vertical R) instance >-^. From the converse direction, we
must start with (D f )0 and a premiss-sequent r>-^aA of (n f ), to derive the
conclusion-sequent: JT, na>-fA. The appropriate instance of (n f )o with
which to begin is no>-0, whence the desired conclusion follows by (M) and
(Vertical T). We close with a Corollary to the availability of these unconditional
or zero-premiss equivalents to the rules (n):
Theorem 7. Any structure for a K^-system is a model.
Notes 1) We thank T.E. Karmo for a correction incorporated in that revision.
2) For example, we pay no attention to questions of Cut-elimination; our interest in the
various rules we present is in their tightness of fit with semantic notions rather than with
such more traditional preoccupations of proof-theorists.
3) On the other hand, many features on which Belnap lays emphasis, such as the 'structure
connectives1 of [2], do not appear here.
4) That is, rules whose schematic statement requires no mention of any connectives. This
usage (and the opposition with 'operational1 rules) derives from Gentzen's work, and is
to be sharply distinguished from the use of 'structural rule1 originating in [9] to mean:
rule such that any substitution-instance of an application of the rule is in turn an
application of the rule.
5) The use of 'cr1, as opposed to k<p\ bi/>', etc., here and elsewhere has no official significance:
we use 'a1, (and below 'r'), for suggestive purposes only, generally when the formula in
question plays a crucial role at some stage in the 'IT position of some sequent in the
inference figure exhibited. Differences in the use of the set-of-formulae variables T\ M\
'Z1 (and, in §5, '0') are likewise themselves purely suggestive.
6) In the case of a zero-(sequent-)premiss rule such as (R), this means simply that every
instance of the schema (R) holds in every structure. Similarly, below, when we speak of
a system as closed under various sequent-to-sequent rules, we mean in the zero-premiss
case that every instance of the schema in question belongs to the system.
7) We use here the nomenclature of [3], [13].
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8) Several such anomalies for the two-place sequent framework (in which a semantic com-
pleteness result for a modal system requires the presence of certain boolean connectives)
are presented in [7].
9) As in the case (R) in §2.
10) Attention was drawn to this notion by Belnap, with a credit to H. Hiz, in [1]; sec [5], [6]
for more recent signs of interest in the topic.
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